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ABSTRACT
Financial incentives may provide a way of reducing the
burden of chronic diseases by motivating people to
adopt healthy behaviours. While it is still uncertain how
effective such incentives could be for promoting health,
some argue that, even if effective, there are ethical
objections that preclude their use. One such argument is
made by Michael Sandel, who suggests that monetary
transactions can have a corrupting effect on the norms
and values that ordinarily regulate exchange and
behaviour in previously non-monetised contexts. In this
paper, I outline Sandel’s corruption argument and
consider its validity in the context of health incentives.
I distinguish between two forms of corruption that are
implied by Sandel’s argument: efﬁciency corruption and
value corruption. While Sandel’s thought-provoking
discussion provides a valuable contribution to debates
about health policies generally and health incentives
speciﬁcally, I suggest the force of his criticism of health
incentives is limited: further empirical evidence and
theoretical reasoning are required to support the
suggestion that health incentives are an inappropriate
tool for promoting health. While I do not ﬁnd Sandel’s
corruption argument compelling, this only constitutes a
partial defence of health incentives, since other criticisms
relating to their use may prove more successful.
INTRODUCTION: CHRONIC DISEASE,
BEHAVIOUR CHANGE AND HEALTH INCENTIVES
Worldwide, considerable public resources have
been spent on health promotion campaigns to
encourage ‘healthy’i lifestyles. Many of these have
focused on raising awareness of the links between
chronic diseases and behaviours such as smoking,
poor diet, lack of physical activity and excessive
alcohol consumption. Despite these efforts, many
people persist in engaging in such behaviours, and
the growing burden of chronic diseases continues
to challenge healthcare providers.1 Socially
deprived groups are more likely to suffer from
chronic diseases and their related disadvantages,
and so chronic diseases may exacerbate social
inequality.
Different approaches to health-related behaviour
change have been proposed, including informa-
tional and educational strategies, social marketing
to shape norms, regulation of industry and subtle
environmental interventions that ‘nudge’ people
towards healthier behaviours. At least some people
engaging in ‘unhealthy’ behaviours would prefer to
quit smoking, eat more healthily, exercise more and
drink less, and yet struggle to do so. For such
people, lack of information may be less obstructive
to healthy behaviour change than difﬁculties inher-
ent in altering socio-culturally engrained habits.2
More recently, there has been interest in whether
the use of explicit ﬁnancial incentives can effect-
ively motivate behaviour change.3–5 Incentive-based
approaches have found support in both social psy-
chological and behavioural economic theories,
since they provide immediate, tangible, certain
rewards that may help motivate and sustain healthy
behaviour adoption.2 5 However, evidence about
the effectiveness of health incentives is mixed (par-
ticularly with regard to habitual behaviours), and
ethical objections to their use are sometimes
raised.3 4 6 7 In this paper, I consider an objection
most prominently advocated by Michael Sandel,
who argues that permitting transactions in certain
contexts—including health-related behaviours—has
a corrupting effect on social values that can justify
the prohibition of monetary exchange.8 9
Throughout this paper, I will use ‘health incentives’
as shorthand to refer to explicit ﬁnancial or quasi-
ﬁnancial incentives paid to people in exchange for
some predetermined change in a health-related
behaviour.
Drawing primarily upon Sandel’s book, What
Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets,
I ﬁrst outline Sandel’s criticism of the expansion of
money markets generally, and of the use of health
incentives more speciﬁcally. I characterise his
concern as including two distinct corruption-based
worries, relating to efﬁciency corruption and value
corruption. Both of these concerns are dependent
on empirical evidence, which I suggest is currently
insufﬁcient to support Sandel’s argument. Further,
I argue that, even if the value corruption argument
was indicated by the evidence, it is not clear that it
provides good reasons to refrain from using health
incentives.
SANDEL’S CORRUPTION ARGUMENT
In his 2012 book, What Money Can’t Buy, Sandel
argues that the extension of money markets into
areas of life previously not subject to such transac-
tions should, on the whole, be resisted.8 9 His
claim is, initially at least, appealing. Sandel provides
vivid examples of instances where the exchange of
money feels, somehow, wrong. Chapters covering
i‘Healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ are problematic terms in this
context, and would ideally be avoided. However, it is
common in health-related literature to use this language
as shorthand to refer broadly to behaviours that are
generally regarded as decreasing or increasing the risk of
suffering from (chronic) disease.
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topics such as ‘Cash for Sterilization’, ‘Paying Kids for Good
Grades’, ‘A Market in Refugees’, ‘Paying to Kill an Endangered
Rhino’, ‘Internet Death Pools’ and ‘The Terrorism Futures
Market’ illustrate the kinds of exchanges Sandel thinks we
should worry about.
Broadly, Sandel’s concern is that the explicit involvement of
money in certain areas of life not previously governed by mon-
etary exchange can corrupt valuable social norms that typically
regulate interactions and exchange in these contexts.ii Sandel
diagnoses a historic era of ‘market triumphalism’, now over, but
which has left a legacy of money market extension into numer-
ous areas of life:
While it is certainly true that greed played a role in the ﬁnancial
crisis, something bigger is at stake. The most fateful change
during the past three decades was not an increase in greed. It was
the expansion of markets, and market values, into spheres of life
where they don’t belong.
What Money Can’t Buy, p. 7
Sandel notes two problems arising from this extension of
money markets. The ﬁrst concerns inequality: by increasing the
importance of money in distributing a wide range of resources,
we reinforce the gap between the rich and poor. I will not dir-
ectly discuss Sandel’s inequality argument here. The second
problem Sandel identiﬁes—and which will be the focus of this
paper—is the ‘corrosive tendency of markets’. Sandel argues
that:
[M]arkets don’t only allocate goods; they also express and
promote certain attitudes toward the goods being exchanged…
when we decide that certain goods may be bought and sold, we
decide, at least implicitly, that it is appropriate to treat them as
commodities, as instruments of proﬁt and use. But not all goods
are properly valued in this way.
What Money Can’t Buy, p. 9
The result, Sandel claims, is that by allowing certain things to
be allocated according to markets, we commodify and corrupt
them. A helpful illustration comes from one of Sandel’s key
examples, relating to a study involving Israeli day care centres.
The centers faced a familiar problem: parents sometimes came
late to pick up their children. A teacher had to stay with the chil-
dren until the tardy parents arrived. To solve this problem, the
centers imposed a ﬁne for late pickups. What do you suppose
happened? Late pickups actually increased.
What Money Can’t Buy, p. 64
Sandel explains this surprising effect as resulting from the
replacement of one norm with another: pre-ﬁne, parents tried
to turn up on time because otherwise they felt guilty for impos-
ing an inconvenience on the teacher. Post-ﬁne, they considered
they were simply paying for the additional time the teacher had
to stay at work.
Sandel’s explanation for the increase in the tendency for
parents to arrive late uses motivation crowding theory.10 This
proposes that incentives substitute an extrinsic motivation for
pre-existing intrinsic motivation. In this case, the monetary
incentive (to avoid a ﬁne) ‘crowds out’ the motivation previ-
ously provided by not wanting to inconvenience the teacher.
This may affect both the observed changes in behaviour and
unobserved changes to the motivations producing that
behaviour.
I think we can distinguish between the two ways in which
Sandel thinks motivation crowding can result in corruption.
First, efﬁciency corruption results from the rise in undesired
behaviour (in this case, the increase in late pick-ups). This is due
to motivation crowding creating the opposite from intended
effect, and reducing the efﬁciency of the system. Second, value
corruption describes the replacement of ‘higher’ norms or
values with ‘lower’ ones. In this case, the introduction of a ﬁne
provides a new motivation—to avoid the extra payment—which
replaces the previous motivation—to avoid inconveniencing tea-
chers. The two effects of efﬁciency corruption and value corrup-
tion are that, ﬁrst, the incentive is ineffective at stopping parents
from arriving late, and, second, it encourages parents to view
teachers as merely instruments providing a service.9
Efﬁciency corruption and value corruption
The distinction between efﬁciency corruption and value corrup-
tion is not explicitly drawn by Sandel. They appear, however, to
be separate effects that can exist independently of one another,
and may provide different reasons for preferring to avoid the
use of incentives. For both the efﬁciency corruption and value
corruption concerns, I am sceptical about the strength and reli-
ability of those reasons. In the case of value corruption, this is
largely due to empirical observability and the correctness of the
explanation for observed effects. I do not object to the claim
that, if incentives have the opposite effect on behaviour from
that intended, they are probably a poor policy option. However,
the likelihood that they will have this effect, and the claim that
this results from the corruption of social norms and values, is,
I think, overstated by Sandel.
First, motivation crowding theory is contentious. While
described in both psychological and economic theories, dis-
agreements persist about whether or not this is a ‘real’ effect,
and if the crowding out of motivation is the mechanism respon-
sible for this effect. In the meta-analyses by Cameron and
Pierce11 and Cameron et al,12 the authors argue that ‘in general,
rewards are not harmful to motivation to perform a task’. This
is contrasted with a meta-analysis by Deci, Koestner and Ryan,
which showed ‘As predicted, engagement-contingent,
completion-contingent, and performance-contingent rewards
undermined free-choice intrinsic motivation’.13 While I do not
have the authority to judge between the disagreements of
experienced social scientists, it seems that, though motivation
crowding (or a similar effect) may arise in some circumstances,
we are not yet in a position to reliably predict what conditions
will lead to this and how signiﬁcant this effect is. A review by
Promberger and Marteau sought to explore whether the avail-
able evidence indicated that health incentives are likely to crowd
out intrinsic motivation, and found that the existing evidence
does not support this.14
These studies are interested in the behavioural effects of
motivation crowding—whether the behaviour of interest
increases of decreases with the introduction (and subsequent
removal) of incentives. It is still possible that value corruption is
occurring even if it does not result in an overall reduction in the
incentivised behaviour (if, for instance, the extrinsic motivation
of the incentive is sufﬁcient to compensate for the reduction in
intrinsic motivation). In the case of the day care centres, we
must consider whether Sandel’s interpretation of the outcome is
correct: whether parents saw the ﬁne as a fee, ceased to feel
iiMonetary valuations and transactions may implicitly operate in many
situations, but for Sandel it is important that the involvement of money
is salient.
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guilty about arriving late to collect their children and became
more likely to think of the teachers in instrumental ways.
Given the information available about the study, it is not pos-
sible to conﬁdently answer this question. It is worth noting,
however, that the authors of the original paper provide a
slightly different explanation for the observed effects:
What this ﬁeld study teaches us, we believe, is that the introduc-
tion of the ﬁne changes the perception of people regarding the
environment in which they operate. In particular, we argue that
the environment in our study, as in many real-life situations, is
deﬁned by an incomplete contract. In the speciﬁc situation under
examination, the exact consequence of coming late was not speci-
ﬁed in the contract between the parents and the day-care centre.
For instance, there was no precise set of clauses specifying the
consequences of one, two, or several occurrences of a delayed
pickup of a child. Parents could form any belief on the matter, as
they probably did, and act accordingly.15
The ﬁne provides a sort of reassurance to the parents:
whereas before, their late arrival might have resulted in the
child being abandoned, or their being barred from the centre,
or receiving a telling-off or some other unpleasant outcome,
now they know they will just have to pay the ﬁne. Also poten-
tially relevant but unmentioned by Sandel is that all of the
centres in the study were private, with parents paying fees for
their children to attend. The form the ﬁne took was an extra
cost added to their monthly bill. The way Sandel presents this
example suggests that the money-free relationship between the
parents and those caring for their children is corrupted by the
introduction of the ﬁne, whereas in fact this relationship was
already mediated by money and payment.
To summarise: both the efﬁciency and value aspects of
Sandel’s corruption argument have empirical components,
which it is not clear are reliably met. Beyond this, however, is
the question of whether or not, even if they are met (ie, that
norms, values and motivations previously operating are crowded
out or replaced by new norms, values and motivations when
money is introduced) we should care. This will be key for the
value corruption argument. In the next section, I will say a little
more about value corruption and how convincing this concern
is, speciﬁcally in the case of health.
VALUE CORRUPTION, HEALTH AND ACTING FOR THE
‘WRONG REASONS’
Sandel thinks that norms guiding behaviour—such as not
wanting to inconvenience others, or being motivated by altru-
ism—are irreversibly diminished when we allow money markets
to spread.9 The reduction in prevalence and inﬂuence of these
norms is to be regretted, aside from their instrumental capacity
to drive desirable behaviours. For Sandel, this (along with his
concerns about efﬁciency corruption) suggests we should resist
the trend for extending money markets into new areas of life,
including the use of incentives in health-related contexts, such
as undergoing sterilisation, losing weight, bearing children,
taking medication and getting vaccinated.8 9
Sandel discusses health incentives directly in a section on
‘health bribes’.9 The discussion focuses on what I have described
as efﬁciency corruption, since Sandel is concerned that paying
people to lose weight or quit smoking will be ineffective due to
motivation crowding: ‘Paying people to be healthy can backﬁre,
by failing to cultivate the values that sustain good health’.9 As
discussed, the evidence on motivation crowding, and the
effectiveness of health incentives, is indeterminate. It may be the
case that, in some circumstances, incentives crowd out intrinsic
motivation and reduce desired behaviours, but in others they
crowd in that motivation and increase desired behaviours,
beyond expectations.iii I will set the efﬁciency corruption
concern aside and concentrate instead on the application of the
value corruption criticism to health incentives.
Sandel thinks health incentives are ‘bribes’ because:
[T]he monetary motive crowds out other, better, motives…
Good health is not only about achieving the right cholesterol
level and body mass index. It is also about developing the right
attitude to our physical well-being and treating our bodies with
care and respect. Paying people to take their meds does little to
develop such attitudes and may even undermine them.
He goes on to say:
Health bribes trick us into doing something we should be doing
anyhow. They induce us to do the right thing for the wrong
reason…. But eventually, we should rise above manipulation… If
health bribes work, worries about corrupting good attitudes
toward health may seem hopelessly high-minded. If cash can cure
us of obesity, why cavil about manipulation? One answer is that a
proper concern for our physical well-being is a part of
self-respect.
What Money Can’t Buy, pp. 58–59
Sandel is worried that the explicit involvement of money in
some areas of life will encourage those domains to be regulated
by monetary, market-based norms and that it will become more
common for people to adopt healthy habits in order to boost
their bank balance rather than their health. Acting for the
‘wrong reasons’ may be a helpful way of thinking about what I
have called the value corruption concern. According to Sandel,
people ought to adopt healthy lifestyles on the basis of health
itself: that to eat well, exercise regularly, not smoke or drink to
excess are required for properly respecting (and valuing) one’s
physical well-being. Sandel is not explicit, but it seems likely
that, on his account, while failure to take care of one’s physical
health alone may show a lack of self-respect, to subsequently
adopt healthy behaviours only because of the introduction of a
monetary payment enhances this, perhaps in addition to display-
ing mercenariness and other similar attitudes.
How conﬁdent should we be, however, in making judgements
about the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ reasons for an action and, simi-
larly, in making normative judgements about the desirability of
norms regulating health behaviour? If I fail to save a drowning
child who I could rescue with relatively little risk or inconveni-
ence to myself, unless someone agrees to pay me £100, I have
acted wrongly. My motive for saving the child should be one of
human empathy and compassion, not the opportunity for mon-
etary gain. In this case, my failure to save the child in the
absence of the incentive makes me deserving of criticism. What
does the additional information that I am willing to save the
child in exchange for money add? This seems to tell us some-
thing about how I value certain outcomes, and my hierarchy of
reasons and preferences. In this case I care more about gaining
£100 than saving a child’s life. Acting for the wrong reasons, in
iiiI have not discussed ‘crowding in’, but it is a similar effect to crowding
out, except that pre-existing intrinsic motivations for an incentivised
behaviour are supported and reinforced when rewards are offered for
that behaviour.10
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the context of ‘bribes’, thus consists in both the failure to recog-
nise certain things as valuable to an appropriate extent and the
inappropriate valuing of other things.iv
There are (at least) two problems with seeking to criticise
people on the basis that they act for the wrong reasons. First,
we must be able to identify what reasons they are acting on.
This is related to the problem of identifying whether and how
motivation crowding is responsible for the perverse effect of
some incentives. Second, we need some means by which to
judge better and worse reasons. In the example above, it may be
uncontroversial to suppose that empathy is a better reason to
save a life than money, but we do not generally extend this to
apply to doctors who work for a salary.
Other authors have discussed related concerns about the
involvement of money in certain contexts. Arguments outlined
by Margaret Radin, Elizabeth Anderson, Michael Walzer,
Deborah Satz and others provide interesting accounts of why
some things should not be subjected to monetary exchange.
Unfortunately, there is not space to do justice to these discus-
sions here.v Similarly, there is a considerable philosophical litera-
ture concerning practical reasons (reasons that guide action).
Particularly inﬂuential here has been Donald Davidson, who
believes that reasons that rationalise a person’s actions typically
both explain why an agent acted as she did and provide a justiﬁ-
cation for her actions.23 Sandel does not provide any analysis of
practical reason, nor how health incentives should be conceptua-
lised as providing reasons for action beyond the implicit assump-
tion that they do act as reasons, inferred from the fact that they
are capable of changing behaviour.
In focusing on Sandel, I only intend my discussion to respond
to his account of the way in which money corrupts. This limits
the reach of the discussion, since others’ related arguments may
provide more successful critiques of the use of health incentives.
Yet, since Sandel’s account of ‘what money can’t buy’ has been
particularly inﬂuential (due, in part, to his public visibility and
reach outside academic philosophy) and since the suspicion of
health incentives he proposes is reﬂected in hostility in the
media, I think it is worth directly addressing the claims that he
makes.24–27
Offering incentives to encourage women to breast feed their
babies might be seen as an example of the wrong reasons being
at work: since breast milk is generally thought to be better for
child health, women are advised to breast feed their babies.
Those who only breast feed when offered an additional incen-
tive may be criticised for failing to value the health of their
child appropriately and caring more about gaining some extra
money. A study that interviewed women enrolled on a breast-
feeding incentive programme, however, found that many
women did not think of themselves as breast feeding ‘for the
incentives’.28 In fact, they often said the incentive did not affect
whether or not they wanted to breast feed. Instead, the women
described the incentive scheme as making them feel valued,
boosting their mood and facilitating good relationships with
support workers. It is not obvious whether or not we should
interpret these women as acting for the wrong reasons, since it
is not clear how their reasons change and what other factors
affected the capacity for their reasons to inﬂuence their
behaviour.
Even if we have a clear idea of what reasons are motivating
people, and how incentives affect this, it will still be difﬁcult to
justify ranking those reasons. Some candidate assessment criteria
might be that reasons should be internally consistent, self-
endorsable, or ones that the agent is able to identify with. But
Sandel seems to want something less agent dependent, based
around valuing things appropriately. For instance, Sandel’s criti-
cism of health bribes rests on the assumption that people ought
to adopt certain healthy behaviours anyway, as a part of self-
respect and valuing health appropriately.9 Yet, if I prefer a sed-
entary lifestyle to an active one (despite the risks that health
promoters claim are associated with my preference) it is not
obvious that I am, ﬁrst, failing to do something I ought to do by
not going running and, second, that this shows a lack of self-
respect and concern for my health. I simply hold other prefer-
ences and values (which may include caring for my health in
other ways). There will be those that wish to argue we do have
obligations, either to ourselves or others, to try to stay healthy,
but this argument is not self-evident, and in claiming that some
reasons, norms and values are ‘better’ or ‘higher’ than others,
Sandel might be guilty of a degree of chauvinism.
Sandel is generally in favour of non-market norms and against
the introduction of money-related norms, yet there are plenty of
examples of destructive (non-monetary) social norms in oper-
ation. In the case of breast feeding, in some groups this is con-
sidered undesirable and taboo, and social norms operate to
dissuade women from breast feeding, sometimes with tragic
consequences.29 30 Anderson also suggests how the norms and
values operating in markets may be differently interpreted:
[On one account], free markets are responsible for moral decline,
anomie and loneliness, and eat away at their own foundations.
[An alternative account] represents capitalism as expanding the
scope of cooperation and trust by enabling people to reap the
gains from trade worldwide, bridging parochial divisions of
nationality, religion, and ethnicity. Capitalism is an engine of
cosmopolitanism, cooling socially dangerous passions such as
religious fanaticism, and overcoming xenophobia. The imperson-
ality, anonymity, and openness of markets to all comers is favor-
ably contrasted with social orders in which people are tightly
constrained by parochial connections and loyalties of family,
ethnicity, and neighbourhood.16
While Sandel’s arguments about the creep of money markets
and market norms into all areas of life sound plausible and
potentially alarming, we must be careful to scrutinise his inter-
pretation of the behaviour of people and groups involved in
monetary exchange, and not to romanticise the alternative
norms and values operating in such contexts.
ivThis ﬁts with others’ descriptions of ‘bribes’. For example, Anderson
says, “A payment is a bribe when the compensation to the recipient is
for a performance that is either not authorized by the relationship or
required by the relationship without payment.”16
vVery brieﬂy: Radin describes how the market value of property may fail
to capture its ‘full’ value (taking into account its personal meaning and
signiﬁcance), since this is incommensurate with a single, monetised
valuation.17 18 Anderson argues that, since the way we treat things
expresses attitudes about how we value those things, subjecting
something to monetary exchange expresses the attitude that we value it
for its instrumental worth.19 20 Anderson is concerned about the
consequences of behaviour that expresses inappropriate attitudes
towards property, relationships, behaviours and values, by involving
them in commodiﬁcation and monetary exchange. Walzer argues that
the ways goods are distributed must be in keeping with their ‘social
meaning’, and we change or undermine previous practices of treating
certain goods when we introduce monetary exchange as a way of
distributing them.21 Finally, Satz has an egalitarian-based concern that in
‘noxious’ markets pre-existing power imbalances prevent people from
trading as equals.22
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper I have outlined Sandel’s objection to the general
extension of money markets, based around concerns that the
introduction of market-based norms and values corrupts pre-
existing, non-market norms. I have drawn a distinction between
efﬁciency corruption and value corruption and, while not
denying their plausibility, offered some reasons for being scep-
tical about the strength and reliability of these criticisms in the
context of health incentives. The most valuable contribution of
Sandel’s critical discussion of the general extension of money
markets, including the use of health incentives, is to provide a
useful counterpoint to discussions in economics and health pol-
icies that fail to recognise the moral relevance of monetary
transactions and consider effectiveness and efﬁciency as their
primary, perhaps the only, concern. I do not, however, think
that Sandel’s argument as it stands, with the current lack of
empirical evidence and theoretical underpinning to support his
claims, provides convincing reasons to think that the use of
health incentives should be avoided.
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